

● PSF: Subject File

OSS: Donovan Reports June 8-13,  
1942

PSF: OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

1942

Donovan Report

No. 13

June 8 to 13

No. 585

June 8, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

In connection with our short wave broadcasts from the Pacific Coast to the Far East we have been using five or six Japanese-Americans for translating and announcing. The Navy has been using Japanese-Americans on the West Coast as instructors in their school there. Some of these people were used jointly by the Navy and by us.

About a month ago General DeWitt informed the Navy and this office that he proposed to move all Japanese away from the West Coast defense area. We took this up with the Navy, and have just completed arrangements for the continued use jointly of these Japanese-Americans by moving them to Denver and Boulder Colorado. My radio engineer is now in Denver arranging for broadcast - line facilities to tie in with our stations on the West Coast in order that there will be no interruption in the services of these translators and announcers. The Navy will continue its school at Boulder.

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 9, 1942.

MEMORANDUM FOR

W. J. D.

Your No. 586, June 8th, I  
approve.

F. D. R.

No. 586

June 8, 1942

8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

We have received word from our representative in Brazzaville, French West Africa, as follows:

"French would welcome radio speech on holiday, July 14, by Admiral Leahy explaining United States policy toward France, emphasizing we are French ally more than ever present situation. Suggest you undertake this immediately."

Would you approve of this? If so, I will get in touch with Admiral Leahy.

No. 587

June 8, 1942

8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

Our representative in Turkey received the following uncensored letter from a neutral diplomat in Berlin:

"The German people, especially the upper classes, no longer speak of a decisive victory. They talk only of the war in Europe ending in a truce. They argue hopefully that the Japs will occupy all of America's attention. Therefore no decision is possible in Europe and the United Nations will realize this. This thought is expressed without much conviction, however. The morale is beginning to stink here. Nazi leaders are haunted by the prospect of disintegration of the home front. It is certain that the morale of the people will again crack before the army will. Machine guns are again appearing in public places. Everybody seems to know, without saying, why they are there."

No. 588

June 8, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is the British Political Warfare  
Executive Italian Directive for the June 5-11 RAF Offensive.

"1. Background--four figure raids captured Italian  
imagination led to omissions distortions by Fascist Home  
Propagandist. First official recognition June 3 ridiculed  
RAF claims.

"a. Directive: Emphasize effects of air offensive  
stressing effects on Italian industries and workers in Italy  
and Germany (latter estimated three hundred thousand by  
Lombrasa June 2) Italian shipbuilding affected by bombing  
German steel industries. Dislocation continental transport  
endangering Italian supplies coal other essentials. Oc-  
casionaly remind Italians Mussolini volunteered participate  
Axis bombing British cities. RAF bombing Sicilian bases part  
strategic operations Libyan campaign.



"2. Food:

"a. Background--usually cheap-plentiful vegetables fruit presently scarce expensive, causing widespread disappointment. Black market in farmers produce flourishing. Fascists withholding drastic measures against farmers, while refusing estimate coming harvest because fear arousing un-fulfillable hopes for larger bread rations.

"b. Directive later.

"3. a. Background--Fascist Home Propaganda unplaying Libyan offensive, leaving Italians uninformed its scope aims.

"b. Directive--Refer to German not Axis attack. Do not commit British to hold Tobruck. Egypt should not be stressed as ultimate German objective. Imply Germans again using Italians for German purposes alone that is to destroy British forces and create diversion intended divert British resources from Russian front. Stick to official British caution for day by day fighting avoiding strategical predictions. Plug American participation using 'General Grant' tank stories. Acknowledge supplies moved to North Africa via Cape as evidence Allied control seas.

"4. Second front: Hint Cologne bombed because rail center for German troops in western France and hinterland.



Scale RAF's preliminary softening unlikely be reduced while weather permits. Stress utter inadequacy Luftwaffe defense retaliatory raids. Hit RAF intense fighter sweeps against western Europe (note: references to raids on southern Italy should not mention bombers base)

"5. Far East and Russia unchanged. For latter follow strategical directive to regional heads.

"6. Do not underline Northern Sea route to Russia.

"7. Shipping losses, unchanged."

No. 589

June 8, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the British political warfare executive French subdirective for the period June 7 to June 14:

Keep Russian front foreground avoiding undue proportion news comment to latest RAF news. Stress "three-fold attack" on Germany. Russians gained advantage Kharkov battle, apparently they still hold Donetz line from Kharkov southeastwards. PWE treatment unchanged.

Treat Libyan battle as undecided following line of Churchill's June 2 statement. German threat to Egypt has been parried. Plug Free French forces Libya; General Koenig is Alsatian.

Continue use:

- a. RAF offensive linked with German production manpower difficulties.
- b. Resistance in occupied countries.
- c. Couple French peoples resistance with Allied offensive. French people still in War.

Use "Allies" instead "United Nations" for phonetic (this verbal suggestion not part subdirective) reasons.

No. 590

June 8, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following report comes to us from our London office:

"The Far East directive meeting of June 5 at the British Ministry of Information was attended by British Political Warfare Executive, British Broadcasting Company and Foreign Information Service of this Office. Considered thesis voiced by Chinese that Japan's main effort now to be directed against China. Opinion doubtful that Chinese really believe this and deduce it disseminated:

- "1. To spur Chinese people
- "2. To spur Allied aid to China.

"While in no way minimizing Jap effort to put China out of war, meeting considered it advisable that Jap Chekiang operations primarily designed to eliminate region as Allied airbase against Japan importance and likelihood of extensive Allied aid to China.

"Meeting considered it advisable to keep strictly

off any discussion of news that Chinese currency has been halved in exchange value within week inside occupied China which similarly affects free China currency.

"None of above points yet officially ratified here.

"Informationally, Burma radio licenses March, 1940 numbered 6321, of which 3000 owned by Europeans, almost 2000 by Burmese and Shans, remainder by Indians and Chinese. 80% were in towns, 55% in Rangoon alone. Towns now mostly flattened. Europeans, Indians, Chinese out of picture as radio audience, leaving only Burmese and Shans out of whose radio total it expertly estimated only approximately 200 sets now functioning. Principal propaganda channels therefore become leaflets and infiltration on which subject detailed memorandum promise."

No. 591

June 8, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

In connection with German directive for the week beginning May 29, the following is the British Political Warfare Executive summary of the German political framework within which news should be fitted.

"There is a continued steady increase in the power of S. S. Herrschaft dominated by Himmler, with Borman his number two, providing an intimate link with Hitler. They derive their power from blackmailing information and by controlling all police secret service and Waffem S. S. (sic). They are busily occupied in putting reliable party or S. S. men in key positions. Although Sauckel is under Goering he is one of their agents. The Gauleiters are assumed to be their tools.

Defensive rearguard fighting is being undertaken by:

a. Big industrialists group in Rustungsrat who regard S. S. and party as amateurs who will bungle war pro-

duction and who are trying to muzzle in on profits. Group A. enjoys the confidence of

b., the bureaucrats and professional classes who feel that their position as Oberster Gerichtsher; to a lesser extent B is supported by

c., the Generals, although most of these have temporarily capitulated to Hitler. H. G. Goering is the link between (2) above and Hitler. He probably still enjoys considerable personal pull.

Ribbentrop is insignificant as are Ley and Goebbels.

Speer is a nonentity who as Hitler's bosom friend moves vaguely between Goering and Himmler.

No ideological difference should be started to exist between these cliques, except the big industrialists who may favor peace or conquest which gets rid of the Gestapo. Probably they realize that all hope of victory is gone. They may be said to be more realistic than the others.

It may be hinted that, apart from the above cliques, there is a large number of officials who are increasingly pessimistic about the war and are ready for Germany to cut her losses. These men, however, have no power.

There is good material in Darre's dismissal. However

never stress the present food shortage, always speak of future possibilities. It may be assumed that there will be a reduction in rations next autumn. Contrast British increases with German prospects, hitting "old clothes collection" beginning June 1. This should be associated with the Army's need for discarded rags.

The general theme of Germany's deteriorated position can be closely coupled with the parallel with 1918-19. Note that June 3 is the anniversary of Colonel Hefter's memorandum in 1918 on the desperate position of Germany."



No. 592

June 8, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

You might be interested in seeing two excerpts from the recent Arabic Press at Beirut.

"German High Command thought it could crush Soviet military forces before end 1941. We've not yet forgotten statements of Fuehrer and Nazi press chief declaring Red army was definitely crushed. German-Soviet war is almost year old and Russian army is stronger, more disciplined, more confident, than ever and heroically faces all enemy attempts to attack. Germans themselves have had to recognize true strength of Soviet Union and emphasize it to attenuate demoralizing effect their successive reverses during winter. Russians will certainly resist to the end--they have adapted themselves to Reich's war strategy, all secrets of which they now know. Soviet counter--offensive will be even fiercer since Russians fight for defense their own land for safety their property and for maintenance their ideals. And Russians

aren't alone, they're supported by greatest powers of world, headed by England and United States who are sending them without hesitation, material they need to beat German army."

"German army hasn't yet lost all its combative strength. Certain that in coming months it will fight desperately to force decision. We musn't be surprised see Germans show some successes at beginning due to forces they've concentrated in certain sectors Soviet front. But long awaited offensive won't be as formidable as last year's because surprise factor no longer exists, because Germans can no longer attack with superior forces in men and material along all fronts, because Red army has during last eleven months learned German strategy and tactics, has adapted itself to them and can now oppose them successfully, and there've been constituted behind German lines corps of patriots who interrupt communications and demoralize enemy troops."

No. 593

June 8, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following quotation is from a letter written by the French Minister at Bucharest, and has been obtained by our representative in Turkey:

"The economic condition in Rumania is appreciably worse as a result of the past winter. Spring came late and sowing was belated. It is questionable whether the handicap can be overcome sufficiently to produce enough for both the needs of the Rumanian Army and population and the German demand. Life is extremely expensive and the few things that are available are at prices fantastic for Rumania. You can imagine how the morality of public servants is further lowered by the price increase. Although it can only be privately expressed, there is nevertheless a wide-spread feeling of discontent. The Army and most people are far from enthusiastic. This does not mean necessarily that the Rumanians won't fight gallantly as they have up to now. For the upper and middle classes

Russia is still Enemy Number 1, but if those people are most afraid of Russia, patriotism, nevertheless, is predominantly anti-Hungarian. Many people fear that their best troops are going to waste in Russia and the Magyars, have cleverly avoided real fighting on the Eastern Front. This feeling was so bitter that Mihai Antonescu had to make a strong speech stating Rumania's old claims; which annoyed Berlin. Among Government circles too deeply entangled with the Axis to withdraw, great uneasiness exists regarding Nazi plans for Transylvania. If the Russians were clever propagandists and not blinded by old imperialistic policy, there would be a clever act to play. This is admitted by leading Rumanians. Russia should declare that she has no further claims on Bessarabia and Bukovina, and that she considers the Vienna Treaty of 1940 completely annuled if Rumania stops fighting and helping Hitler. This would have to be backed by the United States, in whom the strongest confidence exists. These proposals spread by radio, would produce a huge effect on Rumanian opinion."

No. 594

June 8, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following, which may be significant, is the translation of a message sent from Vichy to the French Naval Attache here on yesterday:

"After receiving this telegram, you shall cease to communicate with the Admiralty through the intermediary of the Ambassador and you will make use of your own code.

"You shall, therefore, cease using the groups of five customarily used up to now."(1)

(1) Up until now only the Military Attache and the Air Attache communicated directly with their chiefs. The Naval Attache, on the other hand, communicated through the intermediary of the Ambassador.

No. 595

June 9, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a summary of the British Political Warfare propaganda research on "German opinion on war in Russia."

"Germans told Kerch Kharkov not yet 'the offensive' but are great victories. Most newspapers admit and reflect public serious even anxious unjubilant reaction. Public aware of hard fighting and tremendous cost in German lives.

"Most Germans know what Russian winter was like. This learned from propaganda also from soldiers on leave or invalided out. Public also knows growing number casualties. Proportion of Germans who lost friend or relative on eastern front rose from zero December 1941 to over sixty per cent April 1942 in one of series of sampled groups.

Obituaries again attached by Das Schwarze Korps, April 30, and by Dresdner Neueste Nachrichten, May 6. Private mail also shows widespread complaining over absence of leaves,



wives writing their husbands are away for seven, ten, twelve months at stretch.

"Unhappy feeling of soldiers who do get home on leave reflected in BBC May 15. Many have same reaction British soldiers had on leave in England, 1914-18. See Siegfried Sassoon's books, poems.

"Propagandists efforts prove Russian war was necessary, arises from widespread feeling it was unnecessary.

"That war will last another winter in Russia, maybe many winters elsewhere, now openly admitted.

"Lest picture should appear too black it must be added there still no evidence of any significant fear in Germany of Russian advance into Reich."



No. 596

June 9, 1942

8:30 A.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a digest of the British Political Warfare Analysis of German Home Propaganda.

"German propaganda ministry alarmed at Cologne, Essen raids. Result of their alarm was greater spreading within Germany of news about scale, effect and implications of raids.

"Silence inside Germany concerning number of RAF planes contrasts with Axis propaganda everywhere outside claiming only 70, 100, 150 aircraft participated. But Domei admitted thousand.

"Retaliation pledges reached degree unreality beyond anything comparable. For example: front report June 2 spoke of 'Ipswich, a town which in morning will be smouldering heap debris'. DNB itme June 1 said 'In accordance Fuhrer's words we are retaliating two and three fold on Canterbury'. Policy must be either great stupidity or short term desperation. It can reckon with some short term success

since barrier around Germans still pretty newstight.

"Consolation offered Germans is RAF rate of losses is prohibitive. British leaders being misquoted especially Oliver Stewart. Yet propaganda ministry must know scale RAF operations will not be reduced enough to impress Germans. Churchill and others saying some would be increased were suppressed inside Germany.

"Limited number of microphone interviews with Cologne citizens day after raid gave more vivid impression damage to shelters, were unusually frank, resembling BBC's home service during Blitz.

"Worth noting High Command and air staff did not join propaganda ministry in claiming only 70 raiders or retaliation on Canterbury, Ipswich. Whether this result conflict or lack of contact unknown but on May 29 Flight Lieutenant Rossbach on German radio spoke of Manchester as four engined bomber and seemed not to know Whitley out of production long ago. This ignorance may indicate lack contact between propaganda ministry and air ministry."

No. 597

June 9, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is a digest of the German Directive of the British Political Warfare Executive for the week of June 7th to June 13th.

1. RAF offensive: Stick to hardest news. Make no attempt give effects of raids in Germany until most reliable reports received. Absolutely vital extract last ounce propaganda from raids but more laconic treatment of news, more studiously sachlich our surveys and comments, greater the effect. Make every German feel difference between allied attitude when we have upper hand and behavior two years ago of Germans when they had it. This will have vital effect on German attitude toward our war peace aims. Avoid linking war aims escape clause directly with raids. Give both themes as often as possible but separately in same programme. Avoid direct reference to suggestion that Germans evacuating bombed areas. Make Germans feel bombings brought on not by British policy but by Nazi policy. Churchill's divine retribution theme is excellent but his "people going out into the fields" might produce opposite effect.

2. Inside Germany: Use political framework last week's directive until further notice. Stress (a) industrialists counter offensive but underline only issue is which clique shall enjoy profits power. Himmler's clique is no more anticapitalist than the capitalists (b) remember old clothes collection (c) quote without comment German denials that there is inflation (d) use stories Nazi leaders corruption, if possible in same programme reporting RAF raids (e) further evidence of manpower crisis is recent order locomotive repairs given equal priority aircraft repairs (f) continue warnings of food shortage next winter and assumption of further ration cuts.

3. Russia: This remains main permanent interest of German listener. Discuss reasons for delay of spring offensive, treat Libya as left flank of single eastern front.

4. War aims: Continue as previously.

5. Heydrich death -- die Geachteten: Regard him and his like as outlaws. Link with hostage shootings. We regard as outlaws anyone responsible for shooting innocent hostages but these views should be expressed as personal opinion not as government policy.

6. Sea war: Draw parallel between U-boat war 1917-18 which brought America into action and present U-boat

activity off American coast. Nazi U-boats have brought war home to America stepping up American production while imposing great strain on U-boat crews. To keep one submarine operating off American coast five needed in passage or fitting up. Allude to Murmansk convoy making it clear that only seven ships were sunk whereas German propaganda claimed twice as many.

No. 598

June 9, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following has just come to us from our man in Stockholm.

"The Nazis are now openly admitting their fear of the affects of the air raids upon Germany.

"Last Sunday, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Berlin sent for the representative of a Swedish paper and entreated him to soft pedal nourishment and so forth in Germany and to take into account the troubles Germany has to contend with -- even though the Ministry recognizes that the newspapers of Sweden are independent. This attitude is so different from the usual overbearing demeanor that it gives ground for thought. Previously such a call from the FO for a foreign journalist presaged a blitzkrieg on a minor state.

No. 599

June 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I am leaving for London tomorrow afternoon. If there is anything you wish me to do, please let me know.



No. 600

June 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

You will recall your conversation with Minister Richard Casey early in April. Also my memorandum No. 400 dated April 13.

We have certain representatives of ours in Cairo now and they are working with Casey and his men.

I have just received a message from Casey's man in Cairo (Colonel Ellis), supported by Casey stating that a message is going forward from Cairo to London outlining a specific project for the carrying out of which about £750,000 in gold will be required. I understand it will be taken up with me in London. The suggestion has been made that the gold should remain in the hands of Casey. The question of the gold relates to the discussion which you had with Casey on that subject.

I wanted you to know about this and if possible to have some expression from you before I go in order that I may be guided accordingly in my talks. I have not yet seen the outline of the specific project for which this sum is requested, but as soon as I learn the particulars I will inform you.

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June 9, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

With further reference to my memorandum this afternoon regarding the transaction with Minister Casey, I have just received the following message from him:

"A. I hope very much you will make opportunity in London to discuss increased use of gold coinage for subversive purposes in Middle East area. Hitherto relatively small sum has been used chiefly for support of relief forces to enable them to receive local supplies (food, etc.) to suborn enemy army quartermasters to provide agents requirements and to a limited extent for bribery. Limiting factors so far in effective use of money weapons has been transport and communication difficulties.

B. As I see it, principal uses are as follows:

1. Pay for irregular forces.
2. Purchase of supplies and equipment locally and from enemy.
3. Suborn enemy forces.

4. Support local guerilla leaders in Balkan countries or induce doubtful pro-Axis elements to change sides or undertake sabotage at right moment.

5. Pay for underground organizations. Requirement couriers, saboteurs agents, caiques, skippers, bribed or unauthorized travel.

6. Bribery of those in high places as opportunity offers.

7. Avoid banditry by guerilla leaders by enabling them to pay for supplies and thus avoid arousing hostility of local population.

8. Harbour small store of gold in areas such as Turkey, Iraq and Iran against possible post-occupational requirements.

C. This does not exhaust possibility of use but covers chief requirements. That gold should be used with great care and discretion goes without saying. I am opposed to any large-scale use particularly at this stage. I propose to continue to take personal interest in this matter and will see there is no wastage.

D. A reserve of seven hundred and fifty thousand pounds (sterling) to be drawn against as required should meet probable needs for say next six months.

E. In view of our discussion on this subject following my talk with the President, I would welcome your views

and your support.

F. I hope very much we can agree on general lines of British-American cooperation in S.O.E. matters in Middle East without delay and look forward with anticipation to your visit to London to achieve this."

No. 601

June 9, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is a digest of the British Ministry of Information current Far Eastern intelligence report:

1. Domei May 29 announced General Koiso replaced General Minami as Governor of Korea. Long write-up of Koiso but no particulars on Minami or suggestion of reason for removal. Possibly Minami opposed the introduction of conscription in Korea. In a speech he made during Tokyo visit May 1939 he warned Koreans that claims on "early equality of social and other status are not to be entertained". He may regard conscription as a premature step towards equality. Koiso has announced that "fair and just fraternal spirit" would be his guiding principle in administering Korea. It is recalled that Baron Saito, a previous governor, declared that "towards Koreans, their new brothers, Japanese must always show pure sincerity, infinite love, boundless sympathy", but Koreans continue to be thrashed and tortured. On May 30 Koiso emphasized Korea's importance as a supply base for continental war.

2. May 27 Nichi Nichi Rome correspondent Ono complained to his Tokyo editor that although all Japanese correspondents in

Rome agreed not to cable interviews with returned Axis diplomats, "Asahi alone was mean enough to cable in defiance of this undertaking. Propaganda Bureau is to take proper measures but I apologize deeply that even in the matter of promise breaking I was got the better of by Asahi". May 31 another paper, Yomiuri, complained from Berlin of being swindled by Asahi. There was an arrangement between papers that an offer of a visit to the front must not be accepted unless all papers were included but Moriyama of Asahi slipped off to Kharkov leaving the rest behind.

3. Regarding the above, Ministry of Information expert writes "rest of Axis is learning that in small matters at any rate, and probably in large ones too, the trickiness of the Japanese makes them awkward to handle".

4. Although it was previously reported in German messages from Tokyo that the Japanese say English and not Japanese would be the main "Lingua Franca" in the prosperity sphere, New Delhi on June 1 heard Tokyo carrying on "propaganda about imposition of Japanese as Lingua Franca in Asia". It has also been announced that "at the desire of the inhabitants" radio Batavia will give Japanese lessons thrice weekly.

5. May 24 Japanese controlled Pekin Chronicle published 40 Domei items and only two DNB items although 51 of the latter



might well have been printed. This is considered no doubt symptomatic of a push to expel European influences from greater East Asia.



No. 602

June 9, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the British daily Empire guidance:

Significant Midway Island engagement relatively neglected by Japanese and Axis propaganda. Japan attack was referred to in somewhat vague terms in Axis broadcasts only on Sunday, no Japanese broadcasts on the subject have yet been picked up in London. Domei has not mentioned it. Transocean today merely quotes Reuters report. All this is marked contrast to previous occasions when Japanese have trumpeted successes or alleged successes with great promptness.

No. 603

June 9, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

The following is the translation of a message sent by Henry-Haye to Vichy on June 8:

"Reports written by different journalists confirm those in my previous telegrams.

"They indicate, in fact, that the recent British-Russian-American conferences will be concluded with the following arrangements:

"1) Confirmation of the declaration of the United Nations and of the Atlantic Charter, completed and presented in a form which extends it to the Far East and takes away its exclusive Anglo-American character;

"2) Arrangement between England and Russia, doubtlessly concerning the police zones during the long period of armistice which is to follow (see Sumner Welles' speech) the end of the war;

"3) Conclusion of generalized lend-lease agreements;

"4) Arrangement for a better coordination of military operations and for the opening of a second front.

"It seems that all discussions about territorial clauses will be avoided, at least on the part of the United States, and that all anticipated accords are to be in the form of declarations of principle or of intentions, which are not subject to ratification and approval by Congress."

No. 604

June 10, 1942

12:00 Noon

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I am leaving for Montreal tonight and take off early tomorrow morning for London. I have arranged that if anything comes in that would be of interest to you it will be sent as usual. I plan to see the Secretary of State about noon.

No. 5-47

June 11, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

The following is the text of certain French telegrams exchanged yesterday, June 10th.

Henry-Haye sent the following telegram to Laval:

"J'ai maintes fois signalé à Votre Excellence à quel point tous les moyens d'information étaient ligüés pour représenter, sous les jours les plus défavorables, les efforts du gouvernement français.

"Nourri par des subsides mystérieux, dont certains de source russe, le journal "Pour la Victoire" de Geneviève Tabouis, publie des articles de MM. de Kérillis, Pertinax, Henry Bernstein, systématiquement écrits dans le but d'attiser les différents ou les malentendus pouvant surgir entre les Etats-Unis et La France.

"La violence de certains organes dépasse parfois toute imagination et c'est ainsi que je viens d'écrire à M. Sumner Welles, une lettre de protestation contre un abominable article contre Votre Excellence paru dans les journaux qui reçoivent le service de l'American Weekly Incorporation. Cet article sous la signature d'une soi-disant princesse Karapow, laquelle prétend avoir été en relations avec Votre Excellence, se livre aux plus abominables calomnies

sur la vie privée de Votre Excellence.

"J'ai d'autre part, protesté directement et par écrit auprès de l'éditeur. Si les services de Vichy possèdent des informations sur cette princesse Karapow, j'attacherais du prix à les recevoir le plus tôt possible."

Henry-Haye telegraphed Vichy as follows, on June 11th:

"La division du Proche Orient du Département d'Etat a informé M. Guérin que le Département d'Etat autorisait le départ immédiat pour Casablanca de l'Ile de Ré et de l'Ile d'Ouessant.

"Je ne manquerai pas de vous faire connaître aussitôt que possible la composition de la cargaison de ces deux navires."

June 13, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

From: William J. Donovan

Henry-Haye sent the following telegram to Vichy on June the 12th:

"A sa conférence de presse, M. Cordel Hull a annoncé la reprise des échanges entre les Etats-Unis et l'Afrique française du Nord. Il a fait suivre cette annonce, de commentaires dont Votre Excellence a reçu le texte par les agences de presse.

"SOUS CHIFFRE CONFIDENTIEL. Votre Excellence a d'autre part reçu la composition de la cargaison des deux premiers navires destinés à prendre la mer à destination de Casablanca.

"La cargaison d'un certain nombre de produits contenus dans le deuxième bâtiment s'accompagne d'un certain nombre de conditions qui, je le sais, émanent de l'initiative des services du Colonel Donovan. Il s'agit, en effet, de faire figurer sur les emballages de certaines marchandises telles que le sucre, des inscriptions mentionnant qu'il s'agit d'un envoi de la population américaine.

"Il y a là à n'en pas douter un dessein très arrêté de propagande, qui pourrait coïncider avec des opérations militaires, encore que les experts soient ici unanimes sur l'impossibilité d'interventions américaines en France ou sur le continent européen cette année.



- 2 -

"Quoi qu'il en soit, je vais m'efforcer de faire remarquer qu'il est difficile d'admettre que des inscriptions de propagande américaine figurent sur des emballages de marchandises achetées en fait avec nos propres fonds.

"J'espère arriver à un résultat qui ne ferait que consacrer la vérité, mais je dois tenir compte dans mes interventions de l'activité et du dynamisme des services du colonel Donovan, dont les gens compétents en la matière, comme par exemple notre Attaché de presse, ne cessent de faire l'éloge.

"Je ne manquerai pas de faire connaître à Votre Excellence l'accueil qui sera fait par le Département d'Etat à mes demandes concernant les possibilités d'atténuation des inscriptions suggérées."